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It is truly an honor to be asked to Comment on the work of William Simon, one of the scholars who has done the most to contribute
to the reputation of legal ethics as a field with intellectual rigor and
depth, as well as one with significant implications for legal theory
generally. The power of his critical faculties is unmatched: the platitudes offered by the organized bar in defense of the dominant view of
legal ethics lie in tatters after the sustained assault in the first three
chapters of The Practice of Justice.1 In fact, it can be difficult to find
objections to the dominant view that Simon has not already articulated more forcefully. But his project is not merely critical, as his
construction of the alternative contextual view of ethics shows. His
Mason Ladd Lecture is a welcome extension of the contextual view,
moving from the micro-evaluation of the ethics of individual lawyers
into the macro level of institutional analysis and questions of regulatory regime design. Section I of this Comment is a brief review of this
proposal.
Simon’s work has been a tremendous influence on my own thinking about legal ethics,2 so I have good reason to fear the ignominious
fate of commentators who end up agreeing with the subject of their
evaluation. Indeed there is a great deal in this Lecture to agree with.
Some of his suggestions for reform are so far-reaching, however, that
one is bound to have a few reservations and questions. Section II of
this Comment contains some questions about the details of using a
market-based approach and a diversity of ethical norms to regulate
lawyers. Simon has anticipated many of these objections, none of
which are likely fatal to his project, but some of which seem to be a
bit more problematic than he acknowledges. For example, even if a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful to Andrew Perlman for comments on this Comment and to Rob Atkinson for the invitation to
submit it.
1. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 176 (1998).
2. In this I am not alone. See David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A
Comment on Simon, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 255, 255 (1996); David B. Wilkins, In Defense
of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 271 (1996). The fact that Luban and Wilkins, two other writers
who have influenced me enormously, also cite Simon as an influence makes me doubly cautious in this critical undertaking.
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sufficient number of clients desire to hire high commitment lawyers,
the transaction costs involved in matching up high commitment lawyers and clients may be sufficiently high to thwart the operation of
the reputational market Simon envisions. Section III takes issue
with the argument that nonlegal methods of regulation can avoid the
corruption of regulation by self-interested professionals. Although
nonlegal regulation offers many advantages over a formal scheme of
legally enforceable rules, it is no less susceptible to capture by powerful actors than a system of legal regulation.
I.
There are two interrelated proposals in Simon’s Lecture: The first
is to consider additional sources of legal regulation of lawyers, such
as courts and legislatures in addition to bar associations, which tend
to become corrupted by the economic self-interest of lawyers.3 Institutions not under the control of lawyers have a better record of looking out for the interests of non-clients, and once these other institutions have articulated different norms of lawyering, there is a chance
they may catch on more widely. For example, the response of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to the law firms that assisted Lincoln
Savings focused the attention of many in the profession and the
academy on the justification for strenuously partisan norms of
lawyering in the context of counseling and advising clients.4 Even if
the OTS’s approach did not ultimately carry the day, the debate was
useful. Thus, there is an intrinsic value in a diversity of normative
approaches to lawyering, provided there is some way for regulators
or lawyers themselves to select among them.
Another way to diversify the legal norms that may potentially be
applicable to lawyers is to free states from the American Bar Association’s (ABA) monopoly on the drafting of disciplinary rules.5 The
hope is that one or more states may seek to establish a reputation for
regulatory norms that are more protective of third-party interests
than the current crop of ABA models, including those recently proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission. But why would a state do this,
if the lawyers who control the organized bar have a selfish interest in
limiting the protections offered by the rules to third parties? Here is
where Simon’s second proposal comes in: namely, to rely on informal,
decentralized mechanisms of social control to do some of the work
currently entrusted to formal legal regimes.6 There is a certain irony
3. William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism Without Monopoly, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (2003).
4. Id. at 640.
5. Id. at 648.
6. Id. at 652-54. The contrast between “formal” and “informal” methods of regulation
and “legal” and “nonlegal” regulation is intended to track the usage of these terms in
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here, because the talk of markets, “reputation bonds,” and mechanisms for reducing information costs that inevitably attends this
kind of proposal relies, at its root, on the self-interest of the contracting parties. It is almost as though Simon’s idealistic side hopes that
states, freed from the ABA’s regulatory monopoly, will aspire to rules
that reflect a greater commitment to protecting third party interests,
while his realistic side acknowledges the pervasiveness of market
rhetoric and economic self-interest among lawyers,7 and has therefore tailored a proposal for reform that takes these realities into account. In the end, however, Simon’s market-based mechanism may
be just as susceptible to corruption by the self-interest of lawyers as
the formal, profession-based scheme of regulation that is the target
of the critique in this Lecture.
It is important to clarify the usage of the term “professional monopoly” in the Lecture. Three different senses of the term crop up,
and as a result Simon’s arguments against the professional monopoly
can occasionally be inconsistent. One is that the profession seeks a
regulatory monopoly vis-à-vis anything that can plausibly be characterized as “providing legal services.” Simon is right that there is no
principled distinction between, say, tax planning as performed by a
lawyer and by an accountant, so we have reason to be suspicious of
this aspect of the professional monopoly.8 A second sense of monopoly, though, exists within the profession, because each state maintains a monopoly over the practice of law within its borders, enforced
through prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law.9 The notorious Birbrower10 case showed the expansive definition of practicing
law within a state that may be articulated by an ambitious state
aiming to protect local practitioners from out-of-state competition.
Simon is again correct that it is almost impossible to draw principled
lines here.11 Corporate lawyers in New York interpret Delaware law
all the time, so the source of law cannot be dispositive. Physical presence is not only an illegitimate proxy for the source of law, as Simon
notes,12 but an anachronistic standard given the prevalence of techROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
Ellickson’s study of cattle ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California, showed that
residents of this rural county relied on informal norms of neighborliness, not formal legal
entitlements, as the starting point for bargaining to settle issues such as cattle trespasses
and boundary fence disputes.
7. Simon, supra note 3, at 5, at 653; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Professor Simon on
the Kaye Scholer Affair: Shock at the Gambling at Rick’s Place in Casablanca, 23 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 323, 324 (1998).
8. Simon, supra note 3, at 644.
9. Id. at 641-44.
10. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 2-3
(Cal. 1998).
11. Simon, supra note 3, at 645-47.
12. Id. at 644-45.
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nology that facilitates interactions between lawyers and clients. And
finally, there is no reason to suspect that resident lawyers are more
competent that out-of-state lawyers, particularly since the law has
such a marked tendency toward national uniformity, with local
quirks being just that: quirks that can easily be mastered by an outof-state lawyer. This leads to the third sense of professional monopoly as used in the Lecture, “monopolistic federalism,”13 which is another way of referring to the hegemonic effect of disciplinary rules
drafted by the ABA and the ALI’s Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers.14 Those two sources of regulatory norms exert so much influence that it is difficult to find much variation among states in the
legal restrictions they place on lawyers.
Actually, one might quibble with the last claim. Some rules vary
quite a bit among the states, and one of the provisions of the ABA
Model Rules that most directly implicates the protection of nonclients, the scope of exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, is the
one on which the diversity of state variation is the most pronounced.
The rules supplement I use in my professional responsibility course
even contains an elaborate chart, prepared by an insurer of large law
firms, which details each state’s rules on the confidentiality rule and
its exceptions.15 Nitpicking aside, though, Simon’s “competitive federalism” proposal is worth thinking carefully about. The heart of the
programmatic portion of the Lecture is a celebration of polycentric
regulation, from a diversity of state-based licensing approaches to a
range of private mechanisms through which lawyers can signal their
levels of ethical commitment, letting the market take over some of
the task of post-admissions monitoring of lawyers’ conduct. I will
concentrate on the second (and least developed) of these proposals,
which is the most radical in its challenge to the regulatory monopoly
of the organized bar.
In Simon’s view, the current disciplinary rules, at least in the
ABA’s model version, articulate a low commitment standard of ethics
in the sense of sacrificing legitimate interests of third parties, and
the substantive justice of a matter, to the interests of lawyers and
clients.16 The classic example is the strict rule against disclosing any
13. Id. at 649.
14. The inconsistency in the attack on the professional monopoly is between the objections to the second and third definitions of monopoly. If the Birbrower decision is objectionable because the practice of law is essentially national in scope anyway, because of the
increasing homogenization of the law itself, as well as the nationwide uniformity in legal
education and bar examinations, then it seems to make sense to regulate lawyers on a national basis as well.
15. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT app. A (2001), reprinted in THOMAS D.
MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
134 (2002).
16. Simon, supra note 3, at 652.
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information relating to the representation of a client even if its disclosure would avert a major financial catastrophe to a third party;17
but one could cite many others. Adversarial discovery practice, the
norms governing deception in negotiations, the permissibility of confidentiality agreements in settlements (particularly in products liability cases), and settlement patterns in class actions are all areas
in which the current law governing lawyers protects the self-interest
of lawyers while imposing substantial externalities on non-clients. As
a result of the indifference of the organized bar to the costs to third
parties of the strongly role-differentiated adversary system, lawyers
have forfeited the trust and respect of the public.18 Hence the double
meaning inherent in the title of this Comment: the bar has bankrupted its reserves of public trust, so it is now time to play Teddy
Roosevelt and break up the power of this group to articulate the sole
authoritative body of rules governing lawyers. One method of accomplishing this objective might be to supplant legal regulation altogether—or certain domains of lawyering—with non-legal regulation.
II.
If the existing structure of rules expresses a default position of
low commitment ethics, and if that structure is resistant to change
because of the political power of the organized bar, giving individual
lawyers the power to opt into a system of high commitment ethics
would permit them to make an end-run around the regulatory monopoly of the bar. As Simon uses these terms, high commitment refers to a principled reluctance or refusal by the lawyer to take an action that is unjust, even if legal, and solicitude for the rights of third
parties.19 The old-fashioned term for high commitment lawyers is “officers of the court.”20 Low commitment refers to acceptance of the
dominant view of lawyering, in which the lawyer will take any arguably legal action on behalf of a client.21 The colloquial term for low
commitment lawyers might be “hired guns.”22 An obvious, but misplaced, objection to this proposal might be that self-interested clients
would never select a high commitment lawyer. Lawyers often claim
that clients are seeking “attack dog” lawyers, and that market pressures nudge them in the direction of low ethical commitment and a

17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
18. Macey, supra note 7, at 324-25.
19. SIMON, supra note 1, at 204-05; Simon, supra note 3, at 654.
20. See, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization
“Officer of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349 (2000).
21. Simon, supra note 3, at 654.
22. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught: Can We Improve
Lawyer Professionalism by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better?, 87 KY. L.J. 1019, 1929
(1999).
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“take no prisoners” style of practice.23 Clients don’t care about costs
inflicted upon third parties, but they do care about prevailing in litigation or obtaining a good deal in a transaction. Why in the world
would they ever opt for a high commitment lawyer?
The response to this objection is twofold. In litigated disputes,
there are institutional players, such as courts and other tribunals,
who look after the interests of third parties. These decision makers
are likely to give more weight to the representations of high commitment than low commitment lawyers, because in their experience,
high commitment lawyers engage in less tendentious readings of the
factual record and the law, do not file motions merely to drive up
their opponents’ costs, and generally urge the court to adopt a position that is not grossly inconsistent with the merits of the dispute.24
There are numerous close calls in pretrial litigation and at trial: motions that could go either way, discovery disputes in which the ethical conduct of the parties is an issue that must be decided by the
judge, evidentiary issues decided on the fly by the judge. Although it
would be almost impossible to gather empirical proof of this proposition, it stands to reason that a lawyer who is known for honesty and
probity in dealing with the tribunal would do better in some of these
close cases than a low commitment lawyer.25 In business transactions, if the assumption is that everyone is behaving in a selfinterested manner, affected third parties will take costly steps to protect themselves. If another party in a transaction is dealing with a
low commitment lawyer, she is likely to demand a thorough “due
diligence” process or seek other kinds of assurances that the factual
representations made by the lawyer are accurate, such as an “ex23. Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 392-94 (1991); Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of
Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
773, 778, 792 (1998); Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and
Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 828
(1998); see, e.g., In re First City Bancorp. of Tex. Inc., 282 F.3d 864, 865 (5th Cir. 2002). In
this case, the lawyer got caught and the court affirmed a $25,000 sanction against him, but
one could imagine the lawyer engaging in a cost-benefit calculation, factoring in courtimposed sanctions as a cost, discounted for the probability of their imposition.
24. Cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18-19
(1998) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege and professional duty of confidentiality
penalize clients who have nothing to hide, because lawyers for low quality clients can
mimic the actions of lawyers for high quality clients, making it difficult for judges to differentiate between the two).
25. The only things that one could offer as evidence for this claim are the comments
by judges and lawyers that tend to get made at conferences where civility and professionalism is the topic. See, for example, the remarks of Judge Marvin E. Aspen at a panel entitled “The Rambo Litigator,” The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 229 (1992), and the anecdote in
John A. Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty,
“Lawyer Honesty” and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REV. 93, 97 (1999).
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press 10(b)-5 warranty” that no material information has been withheld.26 A party dealing with a high commitment lawyer, on the other
hand, may be more willing to accept that lawyer’s representations at
face value, without a lot of duplicative investigation or formal warranty documents.27 In both the litigation and transactional cases, a
rational client would prefer the high commitment lawyer because
that lawyer will either maximize the client’s chance of prevailing in
the litigation or minimize the transaction costs associated with a
deal.
In order for the market to reward high commitment lawyers,
there must be a means for clients to discover lawyers’ commitment
levels. The most straightforward method is for the client to have a
history of dealings with the lawyer, in which they can observe both
the lawyer’s level of commitment and the response of institutional
decision makers or transaction partners to that lawyer. In a repeatdealing relationship, if the client prefers a high commitment lawyer,
the lawyer has an incentive to stick to her principles of working for
her client within the constraints of justice, because she will lose the
benefit of future employment by the client if she abandons them.28
Almost as good is a small community of lawyers and clients in which
all the relevant actors know one another and have ample opportunity
to verify the commitment levels of others through face-to-face interaction. Thus, even if a client has not employed a given lawyer in the
past, she may have been opposite that lawyer in a transaction or litigated matter, and had a chance to deal extensively with the lawyer.
Even where the two lawyers have not dealt with one another in the
past, the length of their professional dealings with one another over
the course of a discrete matter still provides each lawyer an opportunity to learn about the other’s tendencies and adjust her behavior accordingly.
Lawyers deal with one another in discrete but lengthy interactions that may be modeled as repeated games.29 They face numerous
opportunities within a single deal or litigated matter to cooperate or
defect from the cooperative solution, as various small conflicts arise

26. SIMON, supra note 1, at 205.
27. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 269-73 (1984).
28. In the jargon of law and economics, the lawyer has a “relationship-specific prospective advantage” as a result of a history of dealings with the client, but risks forfeiting
that advantage by ignoring the client’s wishes for a high commitment lawyer. David
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392-97
(1990).
29. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 520 (1994); see also
SIMON, supra note 1, at 66-67, for a recognition of the arms race or prisoner’s dilemma
structure of adversarial litigation.
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over issues like scheduling and the logistics of discovery or due diligence. In a typical two-party situation, both lawyers would be better
off adopting cooperative approaches at the outset, agreeing to reasonable requests for schedule changes, not filing unduly burdensome
discovery requests or unfairly evading requests, behaving themselves
at depositions, and so forth.30 Each risks that the other side will exploit her cooperativeness, however. One response is the familiar
game theory strategy of “tit-for-tat”: cooperate on the first move, and
then continue cooperating unless the other player defects, and then
respond by defecting.31 Litigators report that they sometimes feel out
their adversaries early in the process, to see if they are inclined to be
cooperative, for example by “experiment[ing] with minor agreements
with opposing counsel early in a case to assess whether they could be
trusted throughout the proceedings.”32 A lawyer’s acquiescence in her
opponent’s request for an accommodation is in effect a “reputational
bond,” which secures her right to reciprocal cooperation from the opponent.33 As long as both lawyers cooperate, things operate much
more smoothly and costs are kept down. If a lawyer gets burned, she
forfeits the adversary’s bond by refusing to extend reciprocal courtesies in exchange, and the litigation becomes more expensive.
The information about lawyers’ tendencies to cooperate or defect
may be pooled within the community of lawyers, through the legal
press, judicial opinions, social interactions at bar association events
and CLEs, and other informal gossip networks. A lawyer who has
earned a reputation for flexibility, reasonableness, and honesty obtains the benefits of reciprocity from adversaries.34 Conversely, ac30. Not all lawyers may perceive this benefit from cooperation and, indeed, some lawyers may prefer pretrial litigation that is bogged down in extensive motions practice if they
are billing by the hour. This qualification is supported by the report of some in-house lawyers, who observe “the economic interest of the hourly fee lawyer to ‘churn’ cases and to
use discovery disputes to run up fees.” Sarat, supra note 23, at 830; see also Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 29, at 516-17. Simon’s reliance on the market to encourage high
commitment lawyers is thus undermined by the way in which most lawyers bill for their
services. I am grateful to Andrew Perlman for this point. Note, however, that it is still in
the interests of each client for the lawyers to cooperate. The problem then becomes designing a mechanism so that clients can learn about the propensities of lawyers to cooperate or
stir up disputes in order to churn fees and giving them effective and inexpensive sanctions
to use against lawyers who run up bills. The difficulty in providing this information to potential clients is discussed infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
31. ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 16, 20-21 (1997).
32. Nelson, supra note 23, at 776; see also Bartlett H. McGuire, Reflections of a Recovering Litigator: Adversarial Excess in Civil Proceedings, 164 F.R.D. 283, 295 n.44 (1996).
33. Charny, supra note 28, at 393.
34. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1756 (2001);
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 29, at 522-23. Similarly, some firms have acquired reputations for forthrightness and intolerance of gamesmanship. One example is Wilmer Cutler
& Pickering, and in particular partner William McLucas, the former head of the SEC’s en-
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quiring a bad reputation may mean that a lawyer’s opponents do not
play tit-for-tat, but instead start out by assuming that the lawyer
will be uncooperative.35 This drives up the cost for the client, one reason why Simon is right to argue that clients would prefer a high
commitment lawyer in many cases.36 Unfortunately for these clients,
information about a lawyer’s level of ethical commitment may be well
known by other lawyers, but as a practical matter not accessible to
clients. It is well understood that individual clients, who are generally one-shot players within the legal system, have difficulty assessing the competence of lawyers and bargaining over the structure of
the lawyer-client relationship, as would be required in order to give
effect to Simon’s proposal to permit clients to select from a menu of
levels of commitment to which they could hold lawyers.37 Even highly
sophisticated clients may not be able to tap into the information networks used by lawyers, however, particularly if they are not repeat
players with respect to a particular geographic legal community or
one defined by a specialized kind of practice. A large manufacturer of
consumer products, for instance, may get sued in any state, and it is
unlikely that it could keep adequately informed about the reputation
of lawyers in each of these locations. Such clients also may have only
episodic need for lawyers in some subspecialty, like environmental or
securities law, while making more frequent use of product liability or
patent lawyers. Perhaps the problem can be addressed by Simon’s
proposal that lawyers be required to disclose their commitment level
up front in negotiations with a prospective client,38 but it seems
unlikely that the organized bar (which is, in Simon’s view, not interested in ceding any of its authority over professional regulation) will
require an explicit discussion of commitment levels between lawyers
and prospective clients. For this reason, highly visible actions that
function as signals of commitment become even more important.
Signaling is a concept from game theory, which assumes that two
strangers are interested in cooperating in order to achieve gains that

forcement division. Calling in Wilmer to perform an internal investigation is a strong signal to outsiders that a corporation is serious about rooting out wrongdoing. Otis Bilodeau,
What Happened to Mark Belnick?, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at 1, 18.
35. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963).
36. There may, of course, be cases in which the client is specifically looking for a low
commitment lawyer. As Andrew Perlman pointed out, the tobacco industry relied for many
years on law firms with a reputation for scorched-earth litigation to deter prospective
plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. Cf. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 29, at 516-17. Simon’s
market-based response to the professional monopoly would do nothing to ameliorate this
sort of unethical conduct by lawyers.
37. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 114-19 (1974).
38. Simon, supra note 3, at 656-57.
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they could not realize acting alone.39 Each party would like to know
whether the other is inclined to cooperate, or to defect, if the possibility exists of realizing a greater gain by cheating than by maintaining
cooperation. This disposition, however, is private information, not
subject to verification by third parties. To put it another way, talk is
cheap, so a low commitment lawyer might induce a client who is interested in the benefits of a high commitment lawyer to hire him,
merely by professing to be a high commitment lawyer. Although talk
is cheap, actions are costly, so a high commitment lawyer can take
the kind of costly action that would be avoided by a low commitment
lawyer.40 This action is the signal. An example of a signal might be
joining a law firm with a reputation for probity or an organization
whose admissions procedures are designed to screen out unethical
applicants.41 The purpose of signaling is to bring high commitment
lawyers together with clients who are seeking that type of lawyer
(call them high commitment clients). High commitment lawyers will
be able to gain a competitive advantage over their low commitment
colleagues if the signals are effective and, crucially, if there is a sufficient number of high commitment clients to make it worthwhile to
invest resources in actions that function as signals.
In order to function as a signal, though, an action must be clear
and unambiguous, as well as difficult to mimic by low commitment
lawyers. Belonging to Firm X is only a signal of being a high commitment lawyer if Firm X effectively screens out low commitment
lawyers through its hiring process. Some research suggests that firm
affiliation is not useful as a signal, because the conduct of lawyers
within a firm is variable, as well as the actions of the firm in different cases.42 It is entirely plausible that Firm X may have two powerful partners, H.C. and L.C., who vary in their commitment to lawyering within Simon’s contextual view, paying due regard to the interests of third parties. In fact, in the ABA litigation section’s study of
ethics of large firm litigators, plaintiffs’ lawyers in two cities were
asked to name the three most and least ethical firms.43 The result
was “only weak convergence,” with a wide disparity of votes, and
some firms even appearing on both lists.44 As one of the study authors concludes, firms may have reputations for litigation style, but
39. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 122-42 (1994); Edward
Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 423, 425-29 (2002).
40. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19-22 (2000).
41. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1765.
42. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 29, at 557; see also John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse,
69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 617-19 (1989).
43. Nelson, supra note 23, at 796-97.
44. Id.
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these reputations can vary across cases.45 The same may be true for
voluntary associations such as the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, particularly if they do not sanction members for violating their high commitment standards. A member of the Academy
may be a high commitment lawyer or a low commitment lawyer, but
the fact of membership alone does not provide the necessary information.46 Contrast organizations like the cotton shippers’ associations,
who expel members for refusing to comply with arbitration awards,47
or the trade associations who employ voting procedures and membership criteria designed to weed out untrustworthy applicants.48 Continuing membership in one of these associations is a signal at least of
the willingness of the member to abide by the organization’s disputeresolution procedures, which in effect means assent to a substantial
body of trade norms and practices of fair dealing. The organizations
Simon mentions, however, do not screen out low commitment applicants or sanction low commitment members,49 so low commitment
lawyers may join in the hopes of duping high commitment clients
into retaining them. The value of membership as a signal is considerably reduced if it does not enable the creation of a separating equilibrium in the market for legal services, in which high commitment
lawyers and clients match up only with one another, and do not inadvertently match up with those of low commitment.50
The discussion of signaling points in the direction of a significant
complexity elided in the Lecture, namely the definition of a “high
commitment” to ethics. This is certainly not the place to re-enter the

45. Id. at 797.
46. Simon reports that the Academy does not sanction members for violating their
ethical commitments, although it could. SIMON, supra note 1, at 197. The Academy’s bylaws permit expulsion for “failure to maintain the principles of ethics and disciplinary
rules of the Academy.” Bylaws of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, at
http://www.aaml.org/bylaws.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with Florida State
University Law Review). But evidently the Academy does not take an active interest in
purging its ranks of violators. Simon is correct that this inaction diminishes the value of
Academy membership as a signal of commitment. See SIMON, supra note 1, at 214. For a
similar proposal to create a voluntary association with a signaling function, see Humbach,
supra note 25, at 100-06. Members of the “National Association of Honest Lawyers” would
agree to provide “full and fair disclosure of all material facts and evidence that come into
their possession” to anyone with whom their clients have dealings. Id. at 100. The proposal
that this association be empowered to sanction violations of this norm strikes me as wildly
unrealistic, given the ambiguity of terms such as “fair” disclosure and “material” facts and
the information costs that would be associated with proving these violations. These are the
sorts of standards that market participants may be able to discover and monitor, but which
are incapable of verification before a tribunal, at least without extremely expensive and
cumbersome proceedings. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1760-61; Charny, supra note 28,
at 404-05.
47. Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1737-38.
48. Id. at 1765.
49. Simon, supra note 3, at 658.
50. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 19-20.
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debate over the extent to which the lawyer’s role should take account
of the justice of the client’s position, the merits of the case, or the effect of the representation on third parties. Although I have a somewhat different view about the nature of the lawyer’s obligation to the
law and am not as enthusiastic a proponent of nullification as
Simon,51 I do agree that the lawyer’s moral agency requires in some
cases that she either seek to persuade the client to change her position, withdraw, or accept moral responsibility for harms caused by
the client. The problem is that this approach, at best, serves only one
of several competing views within the academic legal ethics community,52 and is decidedly a minority view among practicing lawyers.
Simon does not call his rhetorical adversary the “dominant” view for
nothing. Given the prevalence of the dominant view, it would not be
surprising to learn that many lawyers and law firms proclaim their
commitment to ethics in the sense of zealous client service. Perhaps
this is only a problem of labels, which could be solved by clarifying
our terms, but I fear that making ethical commitment the basis of
reputational markets and signaling behavior will only lead to confusion. For example, what is the “high commitment” response to the
following cases?
(1) The defendant’s lawyer files a request for an extension of
time to answer a complaint, but through a clerical error it is misdirected. The plaintiff’s lawyer, knowing of the mistake, has the opportunity to file a motion for a default judgment.53 Does she do it?
(2) In a product liability case, the defendant’s lawyers define
the terms in a discovery request narrowly, to avoid producing an
inculpatory document. The plaintiffs do not object or file a motion
to compel.54 Is the defense lawyer’s conduct proper?
(3) A defendant is charged with armed robbery and has admitted the crime to his lawyer. At the preliminary hearing the victim
testified that the crime took place at midnight, when the defendant was (truthfully) playing cards with three friends, all of whom
have a good reputation in the community and will probably be be-

51. Cf. William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 421 (2001).
52. For powerful moral arguments that lawyers are permitted or required to take all
actions on behalf of their clients within the framework of law without regard to the justice
of their clients’ ends, see, for example, Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966);
W. William Hodes, Accepting and Rejecting Clients: The Moral Autonomy of the Second-tothe-Last Lawyer in Town, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 977 (2000); W. William Hodes, Lord
Brougham, The Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1075 (1996); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
53. Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. 1989).
54. A slight modification on the facts of Washington State Physicians Insurance
Exchange & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993).
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lieved by the jury.55 Unfortunately, the victim was mixed up on the
time, probably because the defendant had hit him on the head in
the course of the robbery. (The crime actually occurred at 2:00
a.m.) The defendant is not going to take the stand. May the lawyer
call the friends to testify about the card game?
(4) A man whose lifelong dream has been to run a
restaurant persuades a millionaire cousin to lend him $100,000;
the man signs a demand note to the cousin. The restaurant is a
spectacular success, so the conniving cousin immediately calls the
note and brings an action on it, intending to acquire the restaurant
in a foreclosure sale. The man goes to a lawyer who, seeing little in
the way of defense on the merits, files a series of dilatory motions
to give the cousin time to pay back the note from revenues from
the restaurant. The motions are not frivolous in the Rule 11 sense,
but they are extremely unlikely to affect the result on the merits.
Is this a high commitment or low commitment stance with respect
to ethics?
Does the answer change if the client is a construction company
whose falling debris injured a single mother of three children who
worked as a housekeeper and is now permanently disabled, and
where the delay will put pressure on the plaintiff to settle early
and cheaply?56

Because the boundaries of the relevant context are contestable, I
suspect that there would be little convergence on a single answer to
each of these cases, even among lawyers who accept the basic outlines of the contextual view.57 Thus, high commitment lawyers would
have to figure out a way not only to signal that they “take ethics seriously,” but that their understanding of ethics has a particular result
in a given case, which matches up with their prospective clients’ understanding.58 Again, I do not think it is implausible that a lawyer or
law firm might find this approach desirable, but to the extent
Simon’s proposals depend on information sharing, reputation, signaling, and decentralized mechanisms of enforcement, clarity is of the
essence. Transaction costs would become prohibitive if lawyers and
prospective clients had to introduce all the relevant contextual factors into a discussion of ethical commitment levels.
55. See Mich. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Informal Op. CI-1164 (1987), available at
http://www.michbar.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with Florida State University
Law Review).
56. These hypotheticals are taken from Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad
Person?, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 131, 136-37 (1999).
57. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 712-13 (1998) (stating that because ethical evaluation
calls for complex discretionary judgment, it is difficult to generalize).
58. Simon does acknowledge that the lawyer and prospective client would need to
flesh out what it means for the lawyer to promise to adhere to the “highest ethical standards.” Simon, supra note 3, at 655. I think he is correct to worry about the effect of this informational asymmetry on decentralized enforcement mechanisms, but too optimistic
about the institutional means for alleviating the problem.
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A committed contextualist client with sufficient bargaining power
could always structure the attorney-client relationship contractually,
so that the lawyer would be obligated to act in the interests of justice.
Because of the difficulty in specifying what it means to practice contextually, or in the interests of justice, the transaction costs involved
in this kind of approach appear daunting. However, Simon responds,
in his book and in the Lecture, that this obstacle could be surmounted if lawyers and clients had a diverse stock of ethics rules
from which to choose.59 Often, nonlegal mechanisms of regulation offer transaction-cost savings as compared with the legal system,60 but
Simon is right to point out that institutional actors can nevertheless
play a role in the process of decentralized regulation by, for example,
providing a menu of contract provisions that parties may incorporate
into their agreements.61 There is no particular reason to suppose that
this menu must take the form of state disciplinary rules developed
under a regime of competitive federalism—voluntary associations
could perform the drafting function—although authoritative groups
like the organized bar do have the salutary effect of collectivizing the
costs of this project, preventing free-riding.62 The problem with this
proposal is still disseminating the relevant information throughout
the pool of prospective clients. Even assuming there is a substantial
population of high commitment clients who are not seeking “attack
dog” lawyers, they still must be educated that they can demand a
high commitment lawyer, and that there are standardized provisions
governing the lawyer’s conduct that they can insist be inserted in retainer agreements.63 This education campaign would be expensive, so
only organized groups would be able to fund it, again because of freerider problems that would make collective action by individual high
commitment lawyers difficult. The dilemma for Simon, therefore, is
that the only actors in the market for legal services who are capable
of solving the problem of the organized bar’s corruption are exactly
those actors who are alleged to be corrupt. The grassroots activism of
high commitment lawyers and clients risks being swamped by the
“noise” in the market created by the dominance of low commitment
actors.
Finally, the contexts in which reputational markets and informal
sanctions have shown promise are those in which there are a large
number of potential transactors and the interactions between them

59. SIMON, supra note 1, at 207-08; Simon, supra note 3, at 657.
60. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 28, at 403-08; Macaulay, supra note 35, at 63-65.
61. Simon, supra note 3, at 656.
62. Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1742-43; Charny, supra note 28, at 412.
63. One way of doing this would be to adopt “commitment-forcing rules,” which require lawyers to inform clients that they have a choice of commitment levels for their lawyer. SIMON, supra note 1, at 211.
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are entirely voluntary. Lisa Bernstein has produced richly detailed
studies of nonlegal regulation in the diamond and cotton industries,64
and in both cases, there are enough buyers and sellers that it is relatively costless to avoid doing business with someone in the industry
who has a bad reputation. There are significant differences in the
market for legal services. Most lawyer-lawyer relationships are not
voluntary at all. A plaintiff’s lawyer cannot avoid suing the entity responsible for her client’s injury just because it is represented by the
Low Commitment Law Firm. The only thing the lawyer can do in
that case is protect herself by not attempting to cooperate early in
the relationship. But this only protects the client from the costs of
having her lawyer’s cooperation exploited at some later time in the
lawsuit, not from the greater costs of the lawyers’ inability to cooperate from the outset. A larger number of client-lawyer relationships
are voluntary, at least in some areas of practice, like commercial litigation and criminal defense, although there are some highly specialized practices in which an oligopolistic market for lawyers’ services
exists. With respect to one-shot litigants, however, the episodic nature of their interaction with lawyers and the social differentiation of
these populations of lawyers and clients make it extremely difficult
to acquire the information necessary to seek out high commitment
lawyers (if that is their desire) and to structure the legal relationship
with their lawyer accordingly.65
III.
Simon worries very much about the corruption of formal entities
such as the organized bar, which is beholden to its economically selfinterested members. The dismal record of the state bar associations
in controlling unethical behavior by lawyers is almost taken for
granted, and there seems to be no reason to quarrel with Simon’s assessment on this point.66 Despite powerful critiques by Simon and
others,67 lawyers as a whole do not seem terribly interested in finding
an alternative to the dominant view, in which they can sell zealous
advocacy to clients and rest easy that they will not be held morally
accountable for their clients’ ends. Nevertheless, the hope expressed
64. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115-16 (1992); Bernstein, supra note 34,
at 1724.
65. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 151-75 (1994); Galanter, supra note 37, at 116-17.
66. See also RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 156-57 (1989); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 158-65 (2000).
67. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
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in Simon’s Lecture is that nonlegal regulation will be less susceptible
to capture by lawyers who are not committed to practicing law in the
interests of justice. At the risk of sounding an unduly pessimistic
note on this hopeful occasion, I wonder whether the informal, nonstate-centered mechanisms he favors are any more insulated from
the pressures of lawyer self-interest than the formal, monopolistic,
profession-based regulatory regime he attacks.
The reason for this pessimism is not related only to the persistence of the dominant view, the hired gun ethic, the ideology of advocacy, or whatever one wants to call it, among practicing lawyers.
Rather, Simon’s alternative is vulnerable to capture by selfinterested lawyers by reason of the structure of its enforcement
mechanism. As noted above, reputational markets, gossip, informal
means of retaliation, and decentralized control mechanisms work
better among parties who are repeat players with respect to each
other. In a small town, all the lawyers may have incentives to cooperate with one another;68 in larger cities there may at least be specialized bars in which lawyers follow norms of reciprocal fair dealing
with each other.69 The situation becomes more complicated when we
introduce the lawyer-client relationship. A lawyer may be a repeat
player with respect to judges and other lawyers, but only a one-shot
player with respect to the client. In addition, the client may herself
be only a one-shot player with respect to the litigation system.70 This
asymmetry gives rise to a “confidence game” structure, in which the
lawyer’s primary loyalty is to other institutional players, who assist
her in duping the client into believing that the client is receiving
zealous representation.71 As Marc Galanter puts it, the “real” clientele of a lawyer who represents individuals who have only episodic
contact with the legal system are the other institutional actors.72
Good relationships among, for example, criminal defense attorneys,
prosecutors, judges, and court personnel such as clerks and bailiffs,
are essential in order to facilitate the resolution of cases through
plea-bargaining.73 Furthermore, in order to do well in her own career,
a defense lawyer must have access to courthouse personnel who can
cut her client breaks. By obtaining this access, the defense lawyer

68. See, e.g., DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 140-44 (1990).
69. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago
Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 217, 240-41.
70. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 29, at 512-13, 551.
71. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, LAW & SOC’Y REV., June 1967, at 15, 38.
72. Galanter, supra note 37, at 117.
73. Blumberg, supra note 71, at 18-22.
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becomes a “fixer” who has a valuable commodity—access—to sell to
clients.74
A profound tension thus exists between the procedural entitlements of the client and the systemic interest in the efficient processing of cases. To put it unkindly, criminal defense lawyers sell out
some of their clients in the interests of procedural justice and of longterm economic success. To make the same point more sympathetically, if each client received what he was entitled to under law—a
full, adversarial trial on the merits—the machinery of criminal justice would grind to a halt. As officers of the court, lawyers have some
obligation to facilitate the fair and efficient processing of disputes.
The alternative to accepting some of this responsibility is the ethic of
zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law that Simon decries.
After all, the reason he criticizes lawyers who take formally nonfrivolous but substantively unwarranted legal positions is that they
are neglecting their responsibility to facilitate the just resolution of
disputes.75 It may be objected, of course, that a lawyer in Simon’s
contextual view is not permitted to “sell out” her client’s interests
merely to enhance the lawyer’s reputation with other courthouse
regulars. We need not take this uncharitable view of settlement in all
cases, however. Some settlements may be just, if they are calibrated
to the value of the plaintiff’s claims, discounted for the probability of
a defense verdict at trial.76 Moreover, Simon explicitly includes the
effective functioning of the system within his definition of justice,
and charges contextualist lawyers with making the procedural apparatus as efficient as possible, consistent with deciding cases on the
legal merits.77
To the extent that this Lecture can be understood as a brief for
shifting some of the responsibility for regulating the profession onto
nonlegal mechanisms, the problem noticed by Blumberg becomes
more acute. Simon argues that reputational markets should encourage lawyers to increase their level of ethical commitment, because
clients would seek a high commitment lawyer over an attack dog in
order to benefit from the lawyer’s good reputation.78 In litigation, one
way to acquire a good reputation is to acquiesce to reasonable requests by opposing counsel, not annoy judges unduly, and generally
refrain from rocking the boat. “[A] tribunal might reward lawyers
who appear to adhere to high-commitment ethics with procedural accommodation or more ready acceptance of their representations.”79
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 25-26.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 140-41.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
Simon, supra note 3, at 651-52.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 205.
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Everything works beautifully if the judge, other lawyers, and assorted courthouse regulars, like clerks, are interested in doing justice, in the sense of deciding cases on their merits. The trouble is that
the tribunal and all the supporting players may be no more interested in justice than the dominant-view lawyers Simon criticizes. Or,
to put the point less harshly, other institutional actors may act under
a Weberian, bureaucratic conception of justice, emphasizing docketclearing, expeditious handling of cases through settlements and plea
bargains, and efficiency rather than resolution of cases after careful
consideration of the parties’ factual and legal contentions.80 In such a
system, lawyers’ incentives would be largely as Blumberg described
them—to contribute to the realization of administrative values such
as the saving of cost, time, and labor.81
In The Practice of Justice, Simon recognizes the alienating effect
that the rationalization of professional practice through categorical
norms of ethics has on lawyers,82 and argues for the contextual view
as a way of returning meaning to lawyers’ work. By vesting lawyers
with the autonomy to make flexible, substantive decisions regarding
the application of law to their clients’ cases, the contextual view returns artisanal values like personalization, judgment, and craft (i.e.
non-fungibility of one’s work product) to the practice of law, as well
as connecting lawyers’ lives more directly with the pursuit of social
justice.83 His diagnosis of alienation is perceptive, and he may be
right to look to the idealism of law students and young lawyers as a
source of hope for the renewal of the profession’s aspirations. As
noted at the outset, however, this idealism makes an uncomfortable
fit with enforcement mechanisms that depend so critically on the
reputation of lawyers within the professional community. If professional norms become differentiated into low commitment and high
commitment, the only way to avoid a race to the bottom is to make
high commitment strategies more beneficial to clients, which in turn
is plausible only if the consequences of adopting a low level of ethical
commitment are visited on the clients. Unfortunately, the most likely
mechanism for creating this feedback effect creates divided loyalties
on the part of lawyers, who must please other institutional actors
whose commitments may not be to substantive justice. This means
that the lawyer may have an incentive to sell out the short-run inter80. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994).
81. Blumberg, supra note 71, at 23; see also Steven Lubet, Professionalism Revisited,
42 EMORY L.J. 197, 204-07 (1993) (recounting experience as a legal aid lawyer in landlordtenant and collections court, in which the courts had “become bureaucratized to the point
that they bec[a]me concerned with delivering results rather than doing individual justice”).
82. SIMON, supra note 1, at 121-23.
83. See id. at 123-24, 131-32.
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ests of one client in favor of her own long-run interests in maintaining good relationships with the other actors.
Perhaps I am exaggerating the problem because I have unwittingly subscribed to the dominant view position that the lawyer
ought to be primarily loyal to her client, not to the system of justice
generally.84 One person’s “double agent”85 is another’s Brandeisian
lawyer for the situation.86 Nothing in Simon’s Lecture is inconsistent
with the ideal of loyal client service. His point is rather that a lawyer
provides better client service by realizing that opposing counsel and
courts are interested in achieving a cooperative solution to various
problems, such as discovery abuse and misrepresentations in negotiation, and assuming a cooperative posture with respect to these
other institutional players. I do think, though, that the tension between procedural and substantive justice is not likely to go away if
the professional monopoly is dissolved. The market, no less than the
organized bar, is a rough instrument for regulating lawyers’ behavior. Simon’s categorical view is a response to the tension between
procedural and substantive justice, and he envisions trade-offs between the two conceptions of justice as the merits of a particular representation require.87 Precisely because legal ethics is so contextual,
these subtle distinctions cannot be translated into clear, unambiguous signals of a lawyer’s level of ethical commitment, which can be
used by participants in the market for legal services. In the end,
Simon may not be able to have it both ways, with a flexible, contextual, case-by-case approach to lawyers’ ethics and an enforcement
mechanism that depends on clarity and the absence of ambiguity.
Depending on one’s attitude toward the rhetoric of professionalism, whether one regards it as self-serving window dressing or as
genuine ideals to which lawyers ought to respond, Simon’s embrace
of nonlegal regulation is either regrettable or welcome. Authentically
high commitment lawyers presumably adopt this level of commitment because they believe it is morally obligatory, not because they
believe it will help them attract clients. On the other hand, even
morally ambitious lawyers have to eat and pay the mortgage, and it
would be comforting for them to expect that their ethical commitments will not result in losing a race to the bottom. There is a long
tradition in moral philosophy of trying to show that doing the right
thing is ultimately conducive to one’s happiness. This Lecture attempts to show that the marketplace will encourage a race to the top,
84. See generally William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29 (arguing that even critics of the adversary system tend to accept the ideology of advocacy without question).
85. Blumberg, supra note 71, at 39.
86. SIMON, supra note 1, at 127-32.
87. Id. at 139-40.
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if only it could be freed from the strictures of the organized bar’s low
commitment rules. It is an extremely ambitious and hopeful, but not
utopian, claim. Simon does not think we are all angels, only that our
self-interested natures may drive us in the direction of beneficial cooperation.88 A reader looking for more idealism will be disappointed
in this stance, but what we know about lawyers’ ethics in practice
suggests that any serious proposals for reform will have to contend
with the pervasiveness of self-interest and the erosion of professional
ideals.89 If morality is all about striking the appropriate balance between values, then Simon is to be commended for recognizing the
balancing act inherent in professional regulation, and offering a proposal for reform that attempts to get it right.

88. Cf. DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).
89. “As market forces take on greater and greater salience and the competitiveness of
the legal market increases, the very meaning and viability of professionalism as an ideal
guiding law practice is being called into question.” Sarat, supra note 23, at 811.

